Although previous studies have concluded that, in comparative terms, Portuguese citizens exhibit low levels of social, value and partisan left-right attitude anchoring, the truth is that the items used in these studies are rather limited. Moreover, the meaning attributed by voters to each ideological camp was never studied. This study seeks to overcome these limitations. The paper reiterates that in a comparative perspective, Portugal does exhibit low levels of left-right attitude anchoring. This is the point of departure of the paper and also, it is argued, a good reason to try to further understand this case and extract from it inferences about similar cases. One of this study's major findings is that the meanings attributed to the left-right divide are not clear and structured; moreover, this lack of clarity is positively correlated with low levels of media exposure, education and left-right selfplacement. Although the paper tests hypotheses about how different groups (manual workers vs. other social classes; older vs. younger cohorts; post materialists vs. other value groups) might give different meanings to the left-right divide, the major finding is that media exposure and education are in any case the crucial factors explaining the more or less structured meanings for ideological conflicts.
Introduction
Ever since the French Revolution the division between left and right has been of fundamental importance in mass politics, particularly in continental Europe (Laponce, 1981) . At the individual level, the division between left and right functions as an instrument with which to reduce the complexity of the political universe; while on the systemic level it functions as a code of communication (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990, 205) .
In spite of all the theories about the end of ideology, the end of history, and a certain overcoming of the division between left and right (for a review see Heywood, 2003) , the truth is that these same theories have been clothed in an ideological character that, soon after being formulated and defended, were followed either by the appearance of new ideological forms or by the renewed prominence of 'old' ideologies (Heywood, 2003) .
Moreover, several studies have revealed there is little empirical evidence to support the end of ideology thesis, either at the mass level or at the party system level (Knutsen, 1997; Van der Eijk et al, 2005; Freire, 2006; Dalton, 2006) .
Contrary to that which is rather common in other countries (Sani and Montero, 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990) , previous studies of the Portuguese electorate have never been able to systematically study the meaning Portuguese electors themselves attribute to this political divide over left-right orientations (see Freire, 2006 Freire, , 2008 . This is because those studies relied on secondary data analysis and/or the study of left-right orientations was-at best-a subject of secondary importance for the original data collectors. However, a research project entitled 'Participation and Democratic Deliberation', which was recently carried out at the CIES-ISCTE (Centre for Sociological
Research and Studies) in Portugal, has overcome these shortcomings. One of the major topics investigated was precisely the meaning and correlates of the left-right divide for Portuguese electors; thus, the questionnaire was specifically designed to tap some of the most relevant dimensions of the divide.
In the first section, and after a literature review of the major components that explain left-right placement, the paper begins by concluding that despite using more appropriate indicators to measure each of the three components of the left-right divide, in a comparative perspective Portugal continues to exhibit low levels of left-right attitude anchoring. This is the point of departure of the paper and also, it is argued, a good reason to try to further understand this case and to extract from it inferences about similar cases, i.e., about countries that also have low levels of left-right attitude anchoring.
A set of specific questions designed to measure exactly what the Portuguese mean by the left-right divide were asked in the referred questionnaire; and from the data available concerning this concept, we derive the second objective of the paper: to understand what the Portuguese attribute to each of the two camps in the left-right divide. We want to evaluate whether citizens can distinguish between different ideological positions and accurately (that is, consistently with what is known from political theory and history, etc.) characterise left and right. Additionally, the third objective is to know if that level of consistency is positively correlated with the individual's level of education, media exposure and political interest. Here we also want to know (fourth objective) whether there is a relation between a person's individual location on the scale (e.g., more to the left, the centre or the right) and the substantive meaning that citizen attributes to each ideological camp.
The fifth objective analyzed here concerns the so-called 'old ' and 'new' meanings for the left-right divide, demonstrated by scholars studying old and new politics (Inglehart, 1984; Flanagan and Lee, 2003) . After a literature review, we test three major hypotheses here. The hypotheses underlying those five objectives will be duly presented and based in the respective sections.
Data
This paper is mainly based upon a survey conducted exclusively in Portugal during spring and summer of 2006 under a CIES-ISCTE research project called 'Participation and Democratic Deliberation', which was directed by José Viegas 1 . The survey was based upon a representative sample of the adult population living in the mainland (N=1000). The sample is multi-stage probabilistic and the data were collected using face-to-face interviews. Two specific sets of questions included in the survey were especially designed to overcome shortcomings of previous studies, namely: first, to measure more appropriately the anchoring of left-right attitudes; second, to understand and explain what the Portuguese substantively attribute to each camp in the left-right ideological divide. However, in the beginning of the paper and to give a comparative overview of the correlates of left-right self-placement, we also used data from the European Value Study 1999.
The anchoring of left-right attitudes: The Portuguese case in comparative perspective
Several arguments have been advanced concerning citizens' left-right self-placement (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997; Freire, 2008) . At the mass level, and as a long-term determinant of political behavior, ever since the publication of Finally, the partisan component refers to that part of an individual's ideological orientation that reflects mainly partisan loyalties (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 244-5; Huber, 1989; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 207; Knutsen, 1997; Freire, 2008) . Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 264-9) argue that the impact of the social component on the citizen's left-right orientation is rather small, especially when compared to the partisan dimension. Perhaps because of their poor results, that dimension has been largely neglected (Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997) , or only considered marginally (Inglehart, 1984 (Inglehart, -1990 . However, in a recent article, Freire (2008) showed that for the social anchors of the citizens' left-right orientations to be properly assessed, they must be correctly specified in three somewhat different dimensions; namely, the socio-structural, the organisational and the identity dimensions. When the model was correctly specified with the addition of the identity dimension, it was possible to reach the conclusion that social factors are an important element in explaining left-right orientations, both in absolute and in relative terms, although more so in some countries than in others.
Nevertheless, Freire's (2008) comparative study was based on secondary data and, as the author himself has recognised, the measures for the (social) identity component were very crude: 'trust in unions', 'trust in large companies' and 'trust in church'. In this paper we follow Freire's approach in respect to the social component. The measures of the three factors that are used to explain each individual's left-right self-placement are presented in Tables A.1 Given the absence of a direct measure for party identification in several recent comparative surveys of the left-right divide (Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997; Freire, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2008) All these results are consistent with previous studies with respect to the low degree of left-right anchoring. First, the total variance explained is rather similar to that found in previous studies, although with a small improvement (31.5 and 29.5 per cent, respectively for 2006 and 1999). Second, the major importance of partisan orientations, followed (at some distance) by social factors, was also found in previous studies. Thus, in spite of the refinements to the measures used in this study, in a comparative perspective the results are still consistent with the low level of left-right attitude anchoring of the Portuguese. There was some improvement in the level of variance explained, but not much. Moreover, this was especially due to the use of party identification, instead of the vote; but for the social factors the evidence points in a direction that is opposite to the one expected.
Overall, the present study confirms that Portugal, along with Austria, Belgium, and Ireland, are among the West European countries that exhibit the lowest levels of left-right anchoring: around 30 per cent or less. This aspect of these four countries makes them special cases worthy of closer inspection. 2 It is precisely because of this divergence from the Western European norm, i.e., from the majority of West European cases analysed in Table 1 , that the Portuguese case deserves to be re-examined with more emphasis on primary data that are designed to clarify the meaning of the ideological divide and magnitude of left-right attitude anchoring. Namely, since there are low levels of left-right anchoring, we can also expect to have a less structured and a less clear view about the substantive meaning of left and right. Moreover, the Portuguese case can provide some hints about the other Western European cases where a low anchoring of left-right attitudes was also found. In this respect, we should recall that in explaining the countries' differences in the level of left-right attitude anchoring, Freire (2008) found that what best explains these differences is not the age of the democratic regime (separating Portugal, Greece, and
Spain from the other polities) but the level of party system polarization (setting apart Portugal, along with Austria, Belgium, and Ireland, from all the other nine countries). If the low clarity of party alternatives is related to low levels of left-right attitude anchoring, it might be also related to a less structured view of each ideological camp -a hypothesis that we cannot test here. Thus, low party system polarization might also be related to citizens' less structured and less clear views on the substantive meaning of left and right.
Before proceeding, a final note should be made. This section is intended to give a comparative overview of the Portuguese case and also to compare the results from the 2006 CIES survey with previous studies, namely Freire (2008) using EVS, but only in terms of the social, value and partisan correlates of left-right self-placement. The rest of the paper, about the meaning of left and right for the Portuguese citizens, has never been done for Portugal (although similar studies with this approach were done for other countries).
Understanding what left and right means for the (Portuguese) citizens is a different approach vis-à-vis the one that relies mainly on the analysis of the correlates of left-right.
The meaning of left and right
Although the importance of ideology in modern democracies has been proven, the literature admits the existence of substantial changes in the contents customarily associated with the traditional ideological dimension. In reality, the political positions currently adopted by left and right can be said to be entwined in the different party manifestos. In this polarisation, equality and freedom has a key role in the web of political values in which the left is essentially linked to the traditional position of defending social change designed to achieve political, economic and social equality. The state plays a central role in driving forward that change; while the right is identified with the instrumental role of the market in promoting growth and economic efficiency and the conservation of the existing socio-political pattern of hierarchies (Heywood, 2003; Dalton, 2006; Freire, 2008) .
Despite that discussion, one aspect of the left-right dimension that has been extensively validated indicates that both political parties and individuals are typically positioned at specific points within a continuum, which can be representative of their positions towards key political issues. However, a number of difficulties can beset expectations concerning the validity of this aspect. For example, Converse (1964) suggests there is a disarticulation between ideology and support for a party: that is, people vote for parties without having a clear commitment to the basic ideological values that underlie them. It is also admitted that only a minority, i.e., the better educated and those with more information, see politics through a political mirror (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992) . Despite these difficulties, it has been shown that people manage to do quite a good job of locating themselves within the framework of the different ideological families and positioning themselves on either the left or right.
Regarding the second goal of the paper, considering what we know about the several possible meanings of the left-right divide, both from the perspective of political theory/political history and from that of empirical political science, a set of 19 questions were asked in order to assess what meanings the Portuguese attribute to the left-right divide. For each of these questions the respondent was asked to say whether he or she considered it to be 'more associated with the right', 'more associated with the left' or 'associated neither with the right nor with the left'. The results, which are presented in Table 2 , tap many issues that are usually associated with the left-right divide. Thus, respondents were asked to locate several issues that are traditionally associated with the old socio-economic left-right divide (wealth distribution, wealth concentration, privatisations, defence of public services, higher taxes, lower taxes, proximity to trade unions and proximity to employers) and with the division between the so-called 'new left' and 'new right' (the level of citizens' participation in political decisions, orientations towards authority, same-sex marriage, traditional families, environmental protection, quality of life, immigration, etc.).
It should be noted that these issues have been usually associated with either the left or the right (whether old or new) in several comparative studies of mass attitudes in
Western societies-although in some countries more than in others (Sani and Montero, 1986; Converse and Pierce, 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Knutsen, 1997; Herrera, 1999; Freire, 2006a; 2006b; 2008) . Studies of the left-right orientations of political parties have also pointed in this direction (Kitschelt, 1994; Budge et al, 2001; Benoit and Laver, 2006) .
Considering the low levels of left-right attitude anchoring in Portugal, found in the previous section and very much in line with previous comparative research, and considering also that one of the major characteristics in the Portuguese party system (Freire, 2008 ) is its low level of polarization (i.e., low levels of clarity in the policy alternatives presented by parties to voters), our second hypothesis points to the following. We expect to find low levels of clarity and the lack of a structured thinking about the substantive meanings of left and right among the Portuguese. Table 2 : The meaning of right and left for Portuguese citizens (%)
INSERT

ABOUT HERE
In accordance with our expectations (hypothesis two), Table 2 shows that, except for three items, the majority of Portuguese believe these issues are associated with 'neither right nor left'. The only exceptions are wealth concentration and proximity to business, which are mainly associated with the right (51.1 and 43.1 per cent, respectively), and proximity to trade unions, which is mainly associated with the left (49.5 per cent). In each one of the remaining 16 issues, the majority of Portuguese were not able to associate them with either the right or the left; indeed, there was almost a tie in the case of privatisation.
With 40.9 per cent thinking it is 'neither right nor left', and 39.8 per cent believing it is 'more associated with the right'. In a way, these results are consistent with the lower levels of left-right recognition and anchoring (in social factors, values and partisan orientations) among the Portuguese found in previous studies (Knutsen, 1997; Freire, 2006; 2006b; 2008) , and can be related to the low levels of polarisation at the party system level (Van der Eijk et al, 2005; Freire, 2006a; 2008) .
Abstracting from the 'neither right nor left' answers, we can see that in all but two issues, the majority of answers are consistent with what we know from political history and political theory, concerning the association of each issue with each camp. For example, while increased citizen participation in political decision-making, same-sex marriage, environmental protection, nationalisation and wealth redistribution tend to be associated with the left; issues such as leaving political decision-making to leaders and experts, respect for authority, respect for family and traditional marriage, hawkish opinions regarding the fight against global terrorism, privatisation and wealth concentration are more associated with the right. The exceptions to this are over higher taxation, which is associated with the right, and lower taxation, which is associated with the left-exceptions that clearly contradict the received wisdom from political history about the content of the left-right divide. This anomaly can be interpreted by the old 'non-attitudes' thesis that was originally formulated by Converse (1964) and restated by Zaller (1992) , which says that people do not present very coherent and structured attitudes on more complex political issues.
As we have seen, if we abstract from the 'neither right nor left' answers, electors usually present answers that are consistent with what we know about the left-right divide;
However, many electors also give responses that are not consistent. Thus, the question of whether consistent responses are positively correlated with an individual's 'level of education', 'media exposure' and 'political interest' arises. If they are, then we can say that part of the inconsistency is due to either a lack of resources and/or political interest (an important set of factors in this respect revealed by previous research: Converse and Pierce, 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Herrera, 1999) . To test this third hypothesis, corresponding to the third goal of the paper, we coded responses that were consistent or inconsistent with political history (values 1 and 0, respectively), or that were 'neither right nor left' (value 0.5). We also constructed two additive indices: one relating to 'media exposure' (three items measuring the frequency with which the respondent read, listened to or watched the news in the print and broadcast media) and a second relating to political interest (which measured interest in local, national, European and international politics, with a further three items measuring the frequency of the respondent's political discussion with friends, family and colleagues). Higher values reveal higher levels of education, media exposure and political interest. If our hypothesis is correct, we should find positive correlations between these independent variables and the type of meaning that is attributed to left and right: that is, the more resources then the more the responses will be consistent with those expected though academic visions of left and right. 
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The correlation between our additive indices (regarding the 19 items) with the independent variables in Table 3 reveals two things. First, it shows that our hypothesis is correct: the greater the resources the more likely it is that the responses will be consistent with what we know about the left-right divide from political history-all the correlation coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, non-consistent answers can hardly be said to be the result of some kind of post-modern syndrome. Second, media exposure is clearly the major factor associated with more consistent answers (0.270), although both education (0.161) and political interest (0.157) also work in the same direction. However, when we attempt to explain variation in the additive indices by using OLS regression with the three above mentioned variables (see Table 5 in the next section), we see the following: media exposure is the single most important factor explaining the level of consistence in left-right meaning; education also counts and political interest does not (that is, its impact is not significant). The tolerance diagnosis reveals no problem of multicolinearity (data not shown). Clearly, therefore, the mass media is the more important channel for enabling citizens to form a clear image of the content of left and right, although school also plays a role in this respect. Political interest has no impact once we control for other variables: its impact is completely mediated by the other factors.
The response to this paper's fourth objective also requires a specific analysis.
Understanding what meanings the Portuguese attribute to each of the two camps in the leftright divide also requires a response to the question: "Does someone's ideological selfidentification make a significant difference to their recognition of the ideological location of political issues on the left and the right?" The expectations in this respect are not very solidly theorised, but we can say, due to the fact that leftwing ideologies are often more structured and that rightwing ideologies are less so (Heywood, 2003) , that there are some reasons to expect more ideological sophistication from left-wingers than from rightwingers. The multivariate analysis presented in Table 4 Two further notes about the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are necessary. Some may argue that while they are significant, the correlations are not very strong, and that the level of variance explained (8.2 per cent) points in the same direction. First, we should bear in mind that correlations with individual level data are usually not very strong-especially when we are trying to explain political attitudes (see Knutsen, 1997; Freire, 2006a) .
Second, the low correlations also indicate that these independent variables do not exhaust the explanations. By using aggregate data, it has been shown that differences in ideological sophistication are larger between countries than between individuals (Freire, 2006a: Chap.
2). Freire (2006a) revealed that the level of ideological sophistication in each country has a positive correlation with the clarity of party alternatives. Given that party alternatives are not very clearly differentiated in Portugal, particularly between the two major parties, this might explain why so many Portuguese cannot locate the political issues and/or why they tend to provide so many inconsistent responses.
The 'old' and 'new' meanings of the left-right divide
Traditional meanings of the left-right divide are related to the so-called 'old politics' content of political conflict: mainly related to wealth creation and distribution, thus with the class cleavage (Inglehart, 1984; Knutsen, 1997; Dalton, 2008; Freire, 2008) . Accordingly, the 'old left' gives more emphasis to socioeconomic equality and to the role of the state in correcting not only market inefficiencies but, most of all, in producing a more equitable distribution of wealth in society. On the contrary, the right not only gives less emphasis to socioeconomic equality but especially gives more importance to the market as the most appropriate mechanism for wealth production and distribution. The class cleavage was the major structural conflict behind this political debate. 'Old politics' also revolved around the religious cleavage but, at least since the end of World War II, religion was more a 'domain of identification' than a 'domain of competition' (Sani and Sartori, 1983) . 
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Considering all that, we defined a set of eight issues (see Table 4 ) related to these old substantive meanings of left and right (wealth concentration and distribution, the role of public services, taxes, proximity to unions or to employers, etc.). Moreover, we constructed an additive index with the answers to these eight items. Like we did for Table 3 , we coded the individual responses that were consistent or inconsistent with political history (values 1 and 0, respectively), or that were 'neither right nor left' (value 0.5).
Here, we want to test the following hypotheses, corresponding to the fourth goal of the paper: first, 'manual workers' are more likely to attribute old meanings to the left-right divide than more affluent social classes (routine non-manual workers, service class, and bourgeoisie); second, older people tend to attribute more old meanings to the left-right divide than younger people.
However, it has been argued that new value cleavages have emerged since the 1960's and that they are gaining more prominence in current political conflicts and, last but not least, that they are changing the substantive content of the left-right divide (Inglehart, 1984; Kitschelt, 1994; Flanagan and Lee, 2003 (2003) Based on the findings of this literature, we defined a set of eleven issues (see Table   4 ) related to these new substantive meanings of left and right. Again, we constructed an additive index with the answers to these eleven items (we used the same coding procedures as for 'old politics'). coefficients. However, we can see that age usually correlates in the expected direction with the additive index (except in three of eight issues where the coefficients are negative); on the other hand, besides being rarely significant, the correlations with social class are more often in a direction counter to what was expected (five coefficients in a set of eight are negative).
In the same vein, it is true that people with post-materialist values do relate the leftright divide to some 'new politics' issues, but the relations are not only weak but also in several cases, they go in the "wrong" direction (five of eleven issues, two of which are significant). No significant correlation was found for age, and there are seven coefficients of eleven in the "wrong" direction. The correlations with the additive index (11 items) are positive in the case of post materialism and negative in the case of age.
After the analysis of the bivariate correlations between the answers concerning both the 'old politics' and the 'new politics' meanings for left and right, we now pass to the multivariate analysis. To test explanations of the old and new meanings for left and right,
we not only consider all the relevant variables for each hypothesis but also some other control variables (education, index of media exposure and index of political interest). 
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In Table 5 , we test the explanations for the old meanings of the left-right divide.
Here we can see that the two major factors explaining congruent answers are education and media exposure: the more educated and informed a person is the more likely he/she is to
give answers about the meaning of left and right that are congruent with old meanings for the left-right divide. However, age also has a significant effect: older people are more likely to give answers similar to the well educated and better informed, confirming our second hypothesis. Thus, once we controlled for the other factors, the positive and significant impact of age did come out. However, the level of variance explained is low (5.4 per cent, less than when we used the additive index with the nineteen items), pinpointing that other factors are also working here, and education and political information are more important than age -please note that colinearity diagnosis revealed no relevant problems of multicolinearity.
We tested also the explanations for the new meanings of the left-right divide. Again, what we can see (data not shown due to the lack of significant results/new evidence) is that the two factors explaining congruent answers are media exposure and education. No other variable, namely post-materialism, is related to the attribution of new meanings to the leftright divide, which is contrary to our expectations. Some final remarks are due in this section. It is true that the analysis of the relationship between both "old politics" and "new politics" with the left-right divide at the mass level is usually done by correlating value orientations and individual left-right self-placement (see for example Knutsen, 1997 and Freire, 2008) . However, the approach used in the present paper is also valid. Recall that we
want to know what meanings the Portuguese think are more associated with the "left", the "right", or neither camp (see Table 2 above). Thus, for example, if young people use "new politics" issues more often to define the meaning of the left, and their elders use "old politics" issues more often, we can clearly say that this is an indication of "the old/new contrasts in the meaning of Left/Right".
Moreover, those people that attribute meanings (old or new) to either the left or the right that are congruent with what we know (from history, political science, political theory, etc.) about the substantive content of each one of the ideological camps can be said to be more politically sophisticated than those that give non-congruent answers. For example, those people that relate "more citizen participation in political decisions", "tolerance of same sex marriage", "wealth redistribution", and "Proximity to trade unions" with the left than with the right, can be said to be more politically or ideologically sophisticated than those that give the opposite answers. And that is why we also explained the attribution of meanings (old and/or new) to each camp via media exposure, education, and political interest (for similar procedures, see Converse, 1964; Converse and Pierce, 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990) . Finally, what we found in the present section is that the attribution of either old or new meanings to the left-right divide in Portugal is more a matter of ideological sophistication than old versus new cleavages.
Concluding remarks
The major findings of the paper are as follows: first, most of the time the meaning the Considering all of the political changes that have taken place in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the expansion of neoliberal globalization, we believe there are some major questions for future studies. First, there is a need for a comparative reexamination of the meaning of the left-right divide among European citizens. Second, we must seek to explain the differences between both individuals and countries. Namely, comparative studies about the meaning of left and right to voters are now rather outdated (Sani and Montero, 1986; Converse and Pierce, 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Herrera, 1999) and this gap needs to be filled with more comparative research. Moreover, following our study, we need to know if in countries where citizens share less anchored left-right attitudes (like Portugal and others) voters also share less structured and less clear visions about the substantive meanings of this ideological divide. Additionally, we need to know if, besides civic engagement and left-right self-placement, the (lack of) clarity of policy alternatives presented by parties to voters play a role here (as seems to be the case for the Portuguese). Freire, 2006, and Freire, 2008 (Greece) , from which we collected the comparative data. Table 3 ).
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3) Dependent variable: Additive index (8 indicators) about the old meaning of left and right (see Table  4 ). 4) Left wingers (left-right self-placement/P9 = 0-3); reference group (centrists = left-right selfplacement/P9 = 4-6). 5) Right wingers (left-right self-placement/P9 = 7-10); reference group (centrists = left-right selfplacement/P9 = 4-6). 
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